ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
In this work, we consider a problem that has two distinct but closely related aspects. The ultimate goal is to use knowledge systems (KSs) to obtain a reasonable solution to the problem of object identification. The 142 A. de Korvin et al KSs provide partial information pertaining to certain features, and the system proceeds in a logically coherent manner to put the evidence together and arrive at that solution. The related aspects is how to gather the needed information. It may be impractical to query all of the KSs. Thus, an important component of the problem is to decide how to pick an appropriate subset of these KSs.
A basic tool that will be used in the present work to deal with both aspects of the problem mentioned above is the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory of evidence. This theory was initiated by Dempster [1] in the context of statistical inference and further developed by Shafer [2, 3] . This theory has important applications in computer vision (Wesley [4] ) and in artificial intelligence (see, for example, the works of Yager [5] , and Yen [6] ). The present authors have used the Dempster-Shafer approach with the integrated problems of decision making and information acquisition [7] [8] [9] .
In the first part of the present work, the KSs are to be viewed as sensors that report on values of certain features in an imperfect manner. The sensors focus on a single object in a list. These objects do not necessarily have a single value associated with a given feature. For example, the same object, if one focuses on the feature color, may be part blue, part red, and part green. The goal is to draw a reasonable conclusion as to what object in the list is the focus of the sensors. We call this the problem of object recognition.
The first type of decision that is considered is really made under purely stochastic uncertainty. In this case, we have access to the probability of the environment under which the decision is made. These possible environments are generated by the possible values of the features under consideration and are fuzzy subsets of the set of possible objects to be recognized. Some simple pay-offs are suggested.
Next we look at more complex pay-offs that reflect how well an object fits the environment. Also, we consider cases where the decision maker (DM) does not wish to use the Dempster rule of combination. Situations where this is the case have been described by L. A. Zadeh [10] . We then define a fuzzy set of pay-offs where the decision depends on the DM's attitude. In that sense the spirit of decision making is similar to the situations in [5] . Finally we discuss the context in which the fuzzy pay-off is defined by how well one object may replace another. This notion is somewhat similar to the distinguishability function discussed by Anvari and Rose in [11] .
In the second part of the present work, the KSs are knowledge bases. The general problem under consideration is to find the right tool to solve a specific task. The KSs report on the needed values of some features to solve the task. In this setting, the pay-offs need not only reflect how well a tool fits an environment, but also how well one tool may substitute for another.
In the last part of the present work, we assume that it may not be practical to access all of the KSs. Techniques similar to the ones discussed previously are developed. A policy of access is developed in terms of performance parameters relative to the network of all KSs. This access policy combines performance knowledge with "good guesses" as to what features should be examined. Policies of looking at one feature at a time as well as policies deciding between competing sets of features are studied. Stopping rules based on the uncertainty in selecting an object are developed.
MOTIVATON FOR THE PRESENT WORK
Much attention has been recently paid by the expert systems research community to the acquisition of knowledge and reasoning under uncertainty. There are many different causes for uncertainty. It may be present because the terms used in the knowledge domain are ambiguous, or the data may be noisy, or the knowledge itself (relating antecedents to consequences) might only be incomplete.
To deal with uncertainly, we must develop techniques other than classical logic. Statistics is the best tool available to handle likelihood. In many situations, however, it is required to estimate probabilities, sometimes without even the benefit of relative frequencies. In such case, estimates can be very inaccurate. The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence gives useful measures for the evaluation of subjective certainty and has recently gained in popularity. Fuzzy sets theory is another tool used to deal with uncertainty where ambiguous terms are present. Other methods include rough sets, the theory of endorsements, and nonmonotonic logic.
A formal theory of possibility has been proposed by R. Giles [12] . In Giles' formulation, the possibility of Proposition A, 7r(A), is the smallest fee for which a given agent is willing to contradict Proposition A and agree to pay a penalty of $1.00 if Proposition A is found to be true. Thus, "the possibility that Carl is in Europe is 0.8" means that if given at least $0.80, the agent is willing to state that Carl is not in Europe and pay a penalty of $1.00 if his statement is false. It is shown in [12] that the probability of A exists if and only if 7r(A) + rr(-~ A) = 1, where -~A denotes the negation of A. In the context of the above example, the probability that Carl is in Europe is 0.8 if the agent is also willing to state that Carl is in Europe for a fee of $0.20, again agreeing to 144 A. de Korvin et al pay a penalty of $1.00 if his statement is incorrect. Formal properties of possibility are established in [12] .
In [13] , consequences of a decision are viewed as belief functions and it is shown that a certain type of preference relation on the belief functions is characterized (up to affine transformation) by a utility function generalizing the von Neumann-Morgenstein utility function.
In [14] , the author contrasts belief functions and probabilities. It is pointed out that the belief function reflects the credal belief, whereas probabilities reflect the pignistic belief (i.e., betting--belief). It is shown how a belief function may generate a pignistic belief (i.e., a probability distribution for betting). Finally, in [15] a method is given to remove ambiguity in decision making when belief functions are used. (This is the case where it is impossible or impractical to assess probability distributions with confidence). One solution, when additional information cannot be collected, is to make an additional assumption. In this work, an interpolation for a point-valued utility within the expected utility interval is made. This assumption leads to the same decisions as would be obtained if there was a probability that ambiguity would be resolved in one's favor.
In [4] Wesley uses the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence as a possible approach to model the "high level" component of vision. The problem there is to identify semantically meaningful visual entities in a digitized and segmented image of some scene. In the "low-lever' phase, scenes are partitioned into regions that are fairly homogeneous with respect to some sets of perceivable features in a scene. The purpose of the "high-level" component is then to put an appropriate label (such as house, tree, grass, water) on the different regions of a scene. Typical image features may include spectral information, texture, shape, and spatial attributes of regions. For example, if the particular feature is texture, possible values for that feature could be relatively rough texture, relatively smooth texture, and the containment of both relatively smooth and rough textures. If, for example, the image contains relatively rough texture, then the observed region could possibly be labeled as tree crown or grass and should not be labeled as sky or road. In this way a correspondence is established between single values of features and subsets of possible labels. A possible difficulty that may be encountered with such an approach is that it may not be totally clear what the specific value of a feature is.
Often information is more complex. The values of the features are not deterministic. These values may be given as fuzzy sets or as stochastic values. We may, for example, say that according to the information given by certain devices, the probability that the object is green is 75% and the probability that the object is blue is 25%. The devices may not be able to distinguish that well between green and blue. We now need to somewhat put a mass of 0.75 on the set of green objects and 0.25 on the set of blue objects. By having information of this form on several independent features and assigning corresponding masses to sets, we again hope to focus on a single object, or, at least, on some reasonably small subset. Finally, a more realistic situation is that in the knowledge base itself, each object has fuzzy features. Thus, an object may a priori not be classified as blue or green, but as part blue and part green. This may come about from the inability of the expert to make a priori crisp classifications. In that case, green would be identified with a fuzzy set of objects.
From the consideration above, it is clear that masses need, in many real world situations, to be defined on fuzzy sets. The focal elements of these masses are fuzzy sets of objects corresponding to possible values of the features. Because there exists a natural way to combine these masses through the Dempster rule of combination, the Dempster-Shafer theory constitutes a natural setting for this situation.
Thus, using masses with fuzzy focal elements has the advantage of dealing with two types of uncertainty. On one hand, it provides good technical tools to handle uncertainty when the estimate of relevant probabilities might prove to be inaccurate; it allows the natural integration of information coming from independent sources. On the other hand, it deals with objects whose classification is not necessarily straightforward. The feature values of such objects are given as partially certain only. For example, color fails to partition objects because, on one hand, the sources of information may not necessarily distinguish sharply between red and blue; on the other hand, even the a priori classification in the knowledge base may fail to be crisp.
In [16] it is pointed out that the plausibility functions of a set of consonant focals is equivalent to that of a fuzzy focal. This is shown by decomposing a fuzzy focal into level sets; however, consonant support functions are more restrictive than possibility distributions in the kind of evidence they represent. They are not appropriate for representing multiple fuzzy focal elements induced from a joint possibility distribution. Also, combining consonant support functions does not always yield another consonant support function. For these reasons, consonant support functions will not be considered here. 
BACKGROUND AND NOTATION
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This is the Dempster rule of combination [2] which applies when m 1 and m E come from independent sources of information. The direct sum represents the mass generated by these two sources. This procedure is sometimes a good model for the situation in which information is gathered from independent sources, but this is not always the case. For a further discussion of this topic, the reader is referred to the article by L. A. Zadeh [10] . In this context, the set X is often called the universe of discourse.
A mass function m on the universe of discourse X generates two important set functions defined on the subsets of X. These are the belief and plausibility functions,
BeI(B) = E m(A),andPls(B) = ~] m(A).
AcB ANB~O
In the present work, it will be very natural to extend the above concepts to the case where focal elements are fuzzy subsets of the universe of discourse. Treating the focal elements as fuzzy sets was first considered by L. A. Zadeh [17] . The reader also is referred to the article by John Yen [16] for these and related notions. Finally, incorporating the approach of R. Yager [5] , we develop the possible set of alternatives. This selection is made under an uncertain environment. If the probability of each environment is known, then the decision is made by maximizing the average pay-off. If this probability is not known, then a rational decision still can be made be defining the DMs attitude, the pessimistic attitude, and a combination of both (the Hurwitz model). He (Yager) also considers this problem from the point of view of regret theory. This general framework is based upon the use of fuzzy sets, possibility theory, and the D-S theory of evidence.
RESULTS
Decisions Under Certainty
Let 01,02,..., O r denote a list of objects and let F1, F 2 .... , F n denote a list of independent features. For example, F 1 could be color, F 2 could be size, F 3 could be shape, etc. Let fi k denote a possible value for the feature /7i. Thus, if F/denotes color, f/l, f/z, fi 3 could refer to blue, red, and green. Of course the range of k depends on i. To each feature i corresponds a knowledge system KSi. It is important to understand that KS i reports only the valued of the i th feature. To make the situation more realistic, we assume that KS~ reports that the object it focuses on has for its i th feature the fuzzy set of values
That is, the object could be 0.8/blue + 0.1/red + 0.1/green. We assume here that ~d~ = 1. k In other words, d/~ measures the probability that F i has value Fi k. We may view the report KS i as being stochastic in nature; however, it will be convenient to retain the fuzzy set notation to express that report. The problem of object recognition is to take the information reported by KSI, KS 2 ..... KS n and to deduce on which object it is most likely that the KSs are focusing. (We are, of course, assuming that the KSs are focusing on the same object in the list 01 , 0 2 ..... O r , but we do not know which one.) Thus, to sum up, independently of any reporting, the value of the ith feature for object j is a fuzzy set of the form ~j = ~ak ~fli k. k Two pathological situations could conceivably take place. Different values of the same feature could generate identical fuzzy sets of objects; e.g., blue and red could generate the same (fuzzy set) A and then m(A) would be undefined if the corresponding d/k are different. Also, the (imperfect) Ks could indicated a value of some feature for which there is no corresponding mass. Note that if we set Fi k = G(ff), then in the terminology of [18] or [19] G(ff) is the fuzzy granule of if, and we define
From now on, we assume that the masses are defined appropriately if the above pathological situations arise. From the above discussion, we see that
KSi generates a mass on fuzzy subsets of objects, and by taking
we combine the reporting of all the KSs into a single mass. Sharer [2] has pointed out that m represents the mass that can be inferred on sets of the form Ail A A h N ...
• Aj, where Aj~ is a focal elements of mk, provided Object Recognition Problem 149 the masses are generated by independent evidential sources. The formula follows by considering compatibility relations from R and S into T and combining them into a compatibility relation from R × S into T. Then the joint probability distribution of the combined evidential sources is computed. The combined basic probability is then normalized. This yields We choose to go with Zadeh's definition of belief and plausibility for fuzzy sets. The methods applied here would carry to other definitions of the inclusion operator.
Zadeh [18] defines belief and plausibility for fuzzy sets as One way to make a relatively simple decision is to pick the object 0j that maximizes Bel{0i}. In the crisp case, recall that Bel corresponds to the lower probability of 0j (see [11) . Now, Bel{Oj} = ~inf(A a ~ Oj)(Aa) , and inf(A~ =~ Oj) = inf Max{1 + lxAo(X), 7j(X)}, 
x#-Oj x~Oj
Intuitively this says that the degree of inclusion of a fuzzy set such as blue v light in 0j is high if any object other than 0j has low membership in blue v light. Thus to recognize the object we compute
Maximizing the Belief of {0j} is a conservative decision. Of course, in the crisp case, this implication boils down to maximizing the lower probability of {0j} given the information regarding the values of the features. In general, one would, more realistically, take into account the upper probability as well as the lower one. One way to introduce this is to evaluate that belief in {Off exceeds the belief in the other competing objects. This difference is given by which is equal to Now,
Bel{Oj} -Bel{ -1Or}
Bel{Oj} + PIs{Oj} -1.
Pls{Oj} = E sup[Min{Tj(X),lXAo(X)}]m(A.) a x
= y'l, tAo(Oj)m(Aa).
a Thus to recognize the object we compute
The most general criterion is to maximize ABel{0ff + (1 -A)Pls(0fl. The closer A is to 1, the more conservative the decision is. We now consider more complex decision-making situations. In [5] , decisions are made in the context of picking an alternative, while a set of possible environments is under consideration. We need to have a pay-off matrix cj, for picking object 0j in some environment S a. Of course we do not know what the environment is (otherwise the decision is easy), but we may have access to the probability of Sa. In this situation we pick Sa= AU i where, as earlier, {kl, k 2 .... , k n} determine a.
If flower is one of the objects in our list of possible objects, we may ask: What is the pay-off for picking flower if the environment is blue /x light as opposed to black /x heavy? Intuitively, the pay-off should be higher in the 152 A. de Korvin et al blue /x light environment. We now give some suggestions as to how cja might be picked. The pay-offs depend, of course, on the specific problems under consideration. Once pay-offs are picked, one may maximize the average pay-off (a standard approach) or if the appropriate probabilities (in this case, the probabilities for environment S a) are not available, then other decisions might be made (decision under environmental uncertainty). Generally speaking, one cannot use the same general logic for pay-offs as we did for beliefs. One can consider absolute pay-offs or how much a pay-off exceeds the competition. A straightforward approach is to set 
.. k,)
. This is a measure of how much better 0y fits Sa than competing environments. At any rate, we assume that some pay-off function cjo is present. In subsequent sections we develop different types of decision making.
Similarity Coefficients
Yet another approach is to introduce the similarity matrix sji [11, 21] .
Here 0 < sji < 1, and sji is a measure of how successfully object 0j may replace object 0 i. This defines a high pay-off for selecting 0j in environment S a if 0j is a good replacement for objects with high membership in S a. This pay-off function combines the degree of membership of object 0j in environment Sa together with how much {0j} can replace {0,}. With this kind of function, the pay-off is high if {0j.} replaces well the objects with high membership in S~. Recalling that a mass can be seen as a probability distribution on the power set of the universe of discourse, the probability of environment S, is
Pr(S,) = m(Sa) = m( ~i Fik')"
Thus the probability of the environment is obtained by meshing the (imperfect) reports of the KSs. We now make our selection by computing
Max ~'~Cjam( Sa). J a
This type of decision is called decision under purely stochastic uncertainty because the probabilities of the environments are known. Here we are maximizing the average pay-off. Y',~= 1C3jm(Ej)
1.2156
Thus, we would pick 02 . This type of decision would favor 03 over 01 .
Decisions Under Uncertainty
In certain situations it is not viable to apply the combination rule to obtain m as we have done above. A discussion on the applicability of the rule of combination is given in [10] . If the DM does not feel that the rule of combination is warranted, then a decision under uncertainty must be made as the probabilities of the environment are unknown.
We choose in this case to view the environment as a fuzzy set E of fuzzy nature states given by F/k' with membership d k' in E. Let cjk ~ denote the pay-off in selecting Oj if the state of nature is F/k~. Again, following previous ideas, we may define the pay-off in several ways:
The interpretation of these formulas is similar to the one given previously for the different pay-offs when the combination rule was applied. Of course, the pay-off function depends very much on the nature of the Object Recognition Problem problem. We now define fuzzy sets of pay-offs by setting where
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Following the spirit of [5] , we now define the attitude of the DM. When decisions are made under uncertainty, the attitude of the decision maker shapes the decision. There are four main attitudes: pessimistic, optimistic, in-between, and minimizing the regret function. For more details, see [5] .
For the pessimistic DM, we select 0j by computing 
To understand the above notation, we write the d~,'s as an ordered set, d 1 <d z< ... <d w.
Then Min cj can be written
For the optimistic DM, we select 0j by computing Rj is the fuzzy regret and cj~, -Max cj is the regret that comes with picking 0j in the environment F, k,.
We now construct another selection where we are willing to use the combination rule and pay attention to functional substitution; that is, we have the matrix sji's as defined earlier. In this case, as already discussed, the KSs are not sensors, but knowledge bases indicating the features of the tool needed to solve a specific problem. This approach somewhat combines the previous methods. Define the pay-off of selecting object j, while object i is the object on which the KSs focus, as sji. We define a fuzzy set of pay-offs by
cj(a) = E Min{ t.£ktii}/Sjt . t
This represents the pay-off of selecting 0j, while the environment is S a where a is determined by (k 1, k 2 ..... k,). It is an indicator of how well 0j may replace objects 0 t and at the same time keeps track of how well 0 t fits into the environment S,. We can now perform computations similar to the previous ones, reflecting any one of the four attitudes that the DM may have. For example, for pessimistic attitude we set
Izj( a) = Min cj( a)
where the rain of fuzzy set cj(a) is defined by expressions analogous to (1), (2) , and (3). We then compute
Max Elzj( a)m( Sa). t a
If we wanted to use the regret approach, then we would define the fuzzy regret by The pessimistic DM will again select 02 and will favor 01 over 03. Of course, it is very conceivable that this example might have given different decisions where less is known as we do not have the probability of the environments. Again, the optimistic DM will pick 02. Once again, he will favor 03 over 01. We have examined several contexts for decision making. These contexts included environments defined by integrating the information given by the KSs and pay-offs defined on how well the objects fit the environment.
Environments defined by individual KSs (integration of information via the direct sum not taking place) and the (fuzzy) pay-offs defined by how well an object could replace other objects. In addition to the context, the attitude of the DM was of importance.
Subsets of KSs
We now assume that it may not be practical to pick all of the available features. It might prove to be too expensive, or some KSs might be too unreliable, or if we have an idea of what the object is, some features might be far more important than others. We can select features by looking at one feature at a time or by selecting a subset of KSs to run in parallel.
If we elect to consider one feature at a time, then we assume that in addition to the KSs, we have control knowledge systems (CKSs) that yield information on performance parameters of the KSs. For example, cost could be a performance parameter and could take on the values cheap, reasonable, and expensive. Reliability could be another performance parameter and take on the values somewhat reliable, reliable, and very reliable.
These parameters play a role analogous to the role of the features in the original object recognition problem, except that the universe of discourse is now the set of KSs. We are assuming that each CKS reports on a single performance characteristic, but globally with respect to the network of where s is a performance parameter (such as cost), pr denotes the r th value of the parameter, and e r denotes the membership of the whole set of KSs for the r th value of performance characteristic s. However, p~ is itself a fuzzy set. Specifically,
This fuzzy set is, of course, defined a priori to any reporting of the CKSs and plays the role of F/k in the previous sections. Thus p,~ indicates the performance KSg relative to the value of p~ for parameter s.
We now take advantage of the fact that each CKS reports on the performance of the network as a whole. This mode of reporting allows us to define masses n, on fuzzy subsets of KSs by n,(P r) = e r.
We define performance environments by s where (r 1 ..... ) determine /3. The pay-offs can be defined in a manner similar to the pay-offs in the previous sections. A particular KS* then can be selected. We could use any of the criteria previously discussed. For example, we could pick KS/* such that i* satisfies where A t denotes the t th focal elements of n and n = n I • n 2 • .... We have to determine if picking the feature i* (and therefore, having KS* report) is enough to recognize the object. If 07 is the object recognized by KS* alone, we consider
This quantity measures the uncertainty surrounding the choice of 07 . If this falls below a certain threshold, then feature i* is sufficient. Otherwise, consider the set of KSg with KS* deleted. Compute again the qualities above to get the feature h* and then recompute the uncertainty where m~' is replaced by m* • m~,. Of course, the new A t will be the intersection of focal elements of m* and m~. We continue this process. We expect that as more features are added, /XA(07) will, hopefully, converge to 1, whereas Max x , o7 i.tA (x ) will converge to 0. Consequently, PIs{O~} -Bel{O~} 160 A. de Korvin et al should converge to 0. It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that uncertainty will decrease to 0 as more and more independent features are added, although we have no formal proof that this will always happen. Once the uncertainty has fallen below a certain threshold, the object that is the current tentative choice (i.e., the object used to make the uncertainty computation) is selected. Of course, we still cannot be sure about the correctness of the selection. What has happened here is that the lower and upper probability has converged to the same value. That value is the regular probability of selecting {07}. We have removed fuzzy uncertainty from the selection, in the sense that information indicating that the object that is under consideration might be {07} or -~ {07}. Stochastic uncertainty remains and is determined by the common value of the lower and upper probability.
Another idea is to pick the feature i*, as indicated earlier, based on performance. Then we pick 07 using the feature i*. Now with each object 07 is associated a list L~ of features to be considered. The rationale here is that for each candidate object, there is a natural list of features that should be examined. If the uncertainty on 07 is small enough, we pick 07. Otherwise, consider the features on L~ and apply the corresponding KSs. If the uncertainty on 07 is not low enough or if 07 still is not the first choice, then go back to performance considerations and pick the feature h* as indicated above. Continue until the uncertainty is low enough. This approach combines performance consideration with good guesses as to what the right features are.
Finally, we now consider the case where we have to choose among competing sets of KSs. Let G o be a typical set of KSs that we consider running in parallel. Let E ~ be the corresponding environment, E~ A r~. .. . The first pay-off reflects how well the set {KSg~ ..... KSg,} fits the environment E ~ over other competing sets of KSs. We compute
Max E C,,n( E " ) t, 13
where n is the direct sum of all cases of n~ as previously defined. Other methods, similar to the ones previously discussed, could be considered.
SUMMARY
We have proposed possible solutions to the problem of object identification, and have available a fuzzy database. An object may only belong partially to a class or classes of objects having certain feature values. This reflects the inability of the expert to properly classify objects. In addition, knowledge systems report stochastically on the feature values of an object. To integrate the incoming information, we note it is convenient to convert the knowledge systems reports to masses. Because the database is fuzzy, the focal element of these masses are fuzzy sets. To make a decision, we note a pay-off function should be available. The pay-off function is highly dependent on the nature of the problem, and once such a function is available, a so-called decision under certainty can be made if probabilities associated with the environment are known. If we integrate the incoming information via the Dempster rule of combination, then decisions under certainty can be made. If we do not wish to integrate the information, then alternate ways to make decisions can be developed. Such alternate ways depend on the decision-maker's attitude. We have considered four fairly typical attitudes.
Certain pay-offs were suggested. In particular, the problem where one object could to some degree, functionally replace another was briefly discussed.
A similar approach was considered when consideration was given to what knowledge systems should be queried. Performance characteristics played a role somewhat analogous to feature values and were the driving factors for this type of decision.
